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INTRODUCTION
Grand jury subpoenas traditionally serve two important functions:
investigatory tools for prosecutors and protections against unfounded
1
criminal prosecutions. In practice, a grand jury subpoena often acts
2
as a “blank check” for federal prosecutors to investigate crimes. As a
result, subpoenas have a potentially dangerous third purpose as afterthe-fact insurance policies to validate an unlawful search. The subpoena power takes on this more troublesome role when combined
with the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule,
which permits the introduction of evidence seized pursuant to an
unlawful search if that evidence would have been “inevitably” discov3
ered without the constitutional violation.
This Comment will discuss the government’s potential abuse of
the subpoena power in light of the inevitable discovery doctrine. In
the wake of the Enron investigation and subsequent corporate scandals, white-collar criminal investigations have received increased at4
tention and funding from federal prosecutors. White-collar investigation is often document-heavy, and subpoenas are a common
5
investigatory tool used by federal prosecutors. Thus, the potential
*
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J.D. Candidate, 2009, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2006, Duke University.
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686–87 (1972) (“[T]he grand jury . . . has the dual
function of determining if there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and of protecting citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions.”); see also
United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 423–25 (1983) (describing the purposes of
the grand jury).
William J. Stuntz, Commentary, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth
Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 864 (2001).
See infra Part I.A.
See Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability, 82 IND.
L.J. 411, 423–24 (2007) (“With the . . . implosion of Enron . . . federal and state governments have stretched their resources to increase prosecution of white-collar
crime . . . . substantially increas[ing] prosecutorial . . . resources . . . [for] white-collar investigations of corporations and their executives.”).
See J. KELLY STRADER, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 14 (2d ed. 2002) (“Most of
the evidence in white collar cases is not obtained by searches and seizures, but rather by
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for Fourth Amendment violations in the government’s abuse of the
subpoena power is becoming increasingly significant. Moreover, in
Hudson v. Michigan, the Supreme Court arguably expanded the interpretation of inevitable discovery by asking what “hypothetically
6
could have happened had the police acted lawfully in the first place.”
As a result, courts may be more willing to admit otherwise improper
evidence because it could have been obtained through a grand jury
subpoena. This Comment seeks to identify the most likely situations
for unchecked governmental abuse of subpoenas and proposes that
courts carefully apply the inevitable discovery doctrine to grand jury
subpoenas.
Part I will briefly examine the development of the exclusionary
rule and the inevitable discovery doctrine. The application of the inevitable discovery doctrine will be analyzed in light of Hudson v.
Michigan, where the Court suggested a broad application of the inevitable discovery doctrine. Next, the purpose of the exclusionary rule
will be contrasted with the purpose of a grand jury subpoena. This
will emphasize the distinct role that the subpoena plays as an investigatory tool for federal prosecutors. Finally, this section will examine
circuit courts that have specifically addressed the issue of applying the
inevitable discovery exception to subpoenas. It will also explore how
the Supreme Court’s application of the inevitable discovery doctrine
in Hudson may suggest how lower courts will apply the doctrine to
grand jury subpoenas.
7
Part II will examine the recent case of United States v. Vilar in the
Southern District of New York. This case provides an excellent forum
in which to examine the application of the inevitable discovery doctrine to grand jury subpoenas. Moreover, this case illustrates how
prosecutors may potentially abuse the subpoena power without
proper judicial vigilance.
Part III will divide the application of the exclusionary rule to
grand jury subpoenas into three categories based on the chronology
of events. Each of the categories will then be analyzed according to
the likelihood that courts will apply inevitable discovery and the potential for governmental abuse. In each case, it will be assumed that
an invalid search has occurred, such as a warrantless search or an

6
7

voluntary responses to grand jury subpoenas.”); see also Stuntz, supra note 2, at 857
(“[M]ost white-collar criminal investigations . . . involve[] the heavy use of subpoenas, not
searches.”).
547 U.S. 586, 616 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
530 F. Supp. 2d 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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overbroad search warrant. The first category is when subpoenas are
issued prior to, or concurrently with, the unconstitutional search.
The second category is when subpoenas are issued after the invalid
search has occurred. The final category is when an invalid search has
occurred, but no subpoena has been issued. This analysis will demonstrate that, as the issuance of a subpoena moves further after the
initial search, courts should be less likely to extend the inevitable discovery exception. Yet, this Comment will argue that even the first
category—the chronology most similar to classic inevitable discovery
and independent source doctrines—presents a dangerous situation
for abuse of the subpoena power.
Part IV will suggest that courts be especially wary when the government attempts to use subpoenas as a source of inevitable discovery. In particular, courts should be more vigilant regarding the first
category—when the subpoena is issued prior to the unconstitutional
search—which is also the most likely scenario in which courts may invoke the inevitable discovery doctrine. This first chronology may
seem harmless on its face, but in fact it opens the door for potential
widespread abuse. If prosecutors can use their subpoena power to
create a “safety net” of inevitable discovery, then police officers would
be given an incentive to perform questionable, or even outright unconstitutional, searches and seizures.
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND GRAND
JURY SUBPOENAS
A. The Exclusionary Rule and the Inevitable Discovery Exception
The exclusionary rule prohibits the introduction of evidence
8
which was seized as a result of an unlawful search. The exclusionary
rule also prohibits the introduction of certain derivative evidence, or
9
“fruit of the poisonous tree.” The main justification for the rule is to
deter unconstitutional police conduct and violations of the Fourth

8

9

The federal exclusionary rule was first adopted in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914). The rule was subsequently applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment
in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984) (“[T]he exclusionary rule reaches
not only primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, but
also evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality or ‘fruit of the
poisonous tree.’” (citing Weeks, 232 U.S. at 383; Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338,
341 (1939))).

758

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 11:3

10

Amendment. However, the Supreme Court has recognized exceptions to the exclusionary rule when the deterrence rationale does not
11
12
13
hold. These exceptions include attenuation, good faith, and the
14
Such exceptions generally apply
independent source doctrine.
when “[i]nvoking the exclusionary rule would put the police (and society) not in the same position they would have occupied if no viola15
tion occurred, but in a worse one.”
One important exception to the exclusionary rule is “inevitable
16
discovery,” which the Supreme Court first adopted in Nix v. Williams.
The inevitable discovery exception provides that tainted evidence
should not be excluded “[i]f the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means” absent the illegal
17
18
search. Although it is related to the independent source doctrine,
the inevitable discovery doctrine requires the court to determine,
“viewing affairs as they existed at the instant before the unlawful
search, what would have happened had the unlawful search never oc19
20
curred.” Given the “hypothetical” nature of this determination,
10

11

12

13
14

15
16
17
18

19
20

See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (“[T]he [exclusionary] rule is a
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.”).
See Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998) (explaining that the exclusionary rule is “applicable only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its ‘substantial social
costs’” (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984))).
The causal connection between the unlawful action and the seizure may be “so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963)
(quoting Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341).
The exclusionary rule should not be applied when officers act in “objectively reasonable
reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 922.
The independent source doctrine permits the introduction of tainted derivative evidence
if the evidence was discovered pursuant to an existing independent source, rather than
the unlawful act. For further explanation, see Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533
(1988), Segura, 468 U.S. at 796, and Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385
(1920).
Murray, 487 U.S. at 541.
467 U.S. 431 (1984).
Id. at 444.
See Murray, 487 U.S. at 539 (“The inevitable discovery doctrine, with its distinct requirements, is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine: Since the
tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent
source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered.”).
United States v. Eng, 971 F.2d 854, 861 (2d Cir. 1992).
Inevitable discovery is based on historical facts. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 445 n.5 (“[I]nevitable
discovery involves no speculative elements but focuses on demonstrated historical facts
capable of ready verification or impeachment.”). However, the inevitable discovery exception requires applying these historical facts to a hypothetical “what if” scenario.
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lower courts have applied the inevitable discovery exceptions to a
21
wide range of situations.
In 2006, the Supreme Court considered the scope of the inevita22
ble discovery exception in Hudson v. Michigan. Hudson presented
the issue of whether evidence seized while performing a warranted
search should be excluded given the failure of police to “knock and
announce” before entering the residence, and the question presented to the Court on certiorari specifically addressed the inevitable
23
discovery exception. Yet, the majority opinion only referenced in24
evitable discovery by implication. The Court never mentioned the
25
Justice
term “inevitable discovery,” nor cited Silverthorne or Nix.
Scalia, in one brief sentence, simply mentioned that “[w]hether that
preliminary misstep had occurred or not, the police would have executed the warrant they had obtained, and would have discovered the
26
gun and drugs inside the house.” With this statement, the Court
posed an almost counter-factual hypothetical to determine inevitability.
While the majority in Hudson offered a pithy discussion of inevitable discovery, the dissent offered a detailed critique of Scalia’s interpretation of the doctrine. Justice Breyer argued that the majority
27
“misunderstands the inevitable discovery doctrine.” Instead of posing a counter-factual scenario to determine inevitability, the dissent
provided a definition of inevitable discovery more closely tied to the
independent source doctrine. As Breyer explained, “[the inevitable
discovery doctrine] does not refer to discovery that would have taken
place if the police behavior in question had (contrary to fact) been

21

22
23

24

25
26
27

Courts often apply the inevitable discovery exception to inventory searches, search warrants, and searches incident to arrest. See Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, What Circumstances Fall Within “Inevitable Discovery” Exception to Rule Precluding Admission, in Criminal
Case, of Evidence Obtained in Violation of Federal Constitution, 81 A.L.R. FED. 331, 332 (2007)
(listing common inevitable discovery applications).
547 U.S. 586 (2005).
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, id. (No. 04-1360), 2005 WL 856040 (presenting the
question: “Does the inevitable discovery doctrine create a per se exception to the exclusionary rule for evidence seized after a Fourth Amendment ‘knock and announce’ violation . . . or is evidence subject to suppression after such violations . . . ?”).
See Chris Blair, Hudson v. Michigan: The Supreme Court Knocks and Announces the Demise of
the Exclusionary Rule, 42 TULSA L. REV. 751, 754 (2007) (“The Court also seemed to suggest that the exclusionary rule would not apply because the evidence would have inevitably been discovered.”).
David J.R. Frakt, Fruitless Poisonous Trees in a Parallel Universe: Hudson v. Michigan, Knockand-Announce, and the Exclusionary Rule, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 714 (2007).
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 592.
Id. at 616 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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28

lawful.” Rather, it “refers to discovery that did occur or that would
have occurred (1) despite (not simply in the absence of) the unlawful
29
behavior and (2) independently of that unlawful behavior.”
As the dissent recognized, Scalia’s reasoning provides an exceptionally broad interpretation of the inevitable discovery exception.
Notably, the majority’s interpretation ignores the traditional view of
inevitable discovery, which required that the “inevitable” seizure oc30
cur independently from the unlawful event. Instead, the majority in
Hudson expands the applicability of inevitable discovery to counterfactual scenarios created by the court.
Professor Frakt even contends that “by relying on not what did
happen, but what could have happened, Hudson in effect creates a
whole new exception—what might be called the parallel universe excep31
tion to the exclusionary rule.” Rather than create a new exception,
Frakt’s “parallel universe” exception could just as easily be considered
an expansion of the inevitable discovery rule. Under this new expansive inevitable discovery doctrine, “courts must ask the following
question: if the same officers had conducted the same search, but
doing only what they were authorized to do under the Constitution,
32
would they have found the same evidence?” This broad reading of
the inevitable discovery doctrine, which ignores the requirement for
an independent source, would allow courts to more easily apply the
doctrine when presented with unlawful police conduct.
With regard to Hudson’s impact on the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, “both liberal and conservative scholars consider
33
the case a major blow to the exclusionary rule.” In a somewhat extreme view, Professor Chris Blair suggests that the Court’s reasoning
in Hudson signals a more general shift on the Court towards the de34
mise of the exclusionary rule itself.
In applying Hudson, lower
courts have recognized Hudson’s narrow holding that violating the

28
29
30

31
32
33
34

Id.
Id.
See id. (“The inevitable discovery exception rests upon the principle that the remedial
purposes of the exclusionary rule are not served by suppressing evidence discovered
through a ‘later, lawful seizure’ that is ‘genuinely independent of an earlier, tainted one.’”
(citing Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 (1988))).
Frakt, supra note 25, at 715.
Id.
Id. at 661.
See Blair, supra note 24, at 751 (“The more long-range effect [of Hudson v. Michigan],
however, may be the actual demise of the exclusionary rule itself.”).
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35

knock-and-announce rule does not require suppression. Yet, some
courts have begun to expand Hudson’s narrow holding to other
36
methods of entry used by police officers when executing a warrant.
The long-term implications of Hudson on the inevitable discovery
doctrine remain uncertain. Joshua Dressler notes that “the Court did
not . . . expressly describe [its reasoning] as inevitable discovery” and
predicts that “the implications for Hudson for the inevitable-discovery
37
doctrine are fuzzy at best.” At least one court has explicitly recognized “[t]he Court’s reliance on the inevitability of discovery in Hud38
son.” Other courts have implicitly recognized Hudson’s impact on
39
inevitable discovery. For example, in United States v. Hector, the
Ninth Circuit considered whether to exclude evidence of a search because the defendant was not provided with a copy of the search warrant. Although the court did not use the term “inevitable discovery,”
it examined Hudson and reasoned that “[r]egardless of whether the
police officers had actually shown Hector the search warrant, they
would have executed it and recovered the drugs and firearms inside
40
his apartment.”
On the other hand, different courts have concluded that Hudson
involved an expansion of the attenuation doctrine, not inevitable dis41
covery. At least one court has explicitly denounced Hudson’s influence on inevitable discovery, reasoning that the “the majority opinion
in Hudson is about causation and not about the inevitable discovery
42
doctrine.” Thus, while the wider impact of Hudson on the inevitable
discovery doctrine remains unclear, some courts have interpreted the
case to expand the scope of inevitable discovery.
At a minimum, Hudson demonstrates the importance of the inevitable discovery doctrine with regard to the suppression of evidence.
35

36

37
38
39
40
41
42

See, e.g., United States v. Ankeny, 502 F.3d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The Court held [in
Hudson] that violation of the knock-and-announce rule did not merit suppression of evidence found in the search . . . .”).
See id. at 838 (holding that the use of flash-bang devices and rubber bullets upon entry
into the home does not require suppression under Hudson); United States v. Makki, No.
06-20324, 2007 WL 1100453, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 12, 2007) (finding that failure to provide defendant with the list of items to be seized upon executing the search warrant does
not require suppression under Hudson).
JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 32 (4th
ed. Supp. 2007).
State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 178 (Minn. 2007).
474 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1155.
See, e.g., State v. Worwood, 164 P.3d 397 (Utah 2007); Royce v. State, No. A05-882, 2006
WL 2347786 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2006).
State v. Callaghan, 222 S.W.3d 610, 615 (Tex. App. 2007).
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One particularly troubling application of the inevitable discovery
doctrine involves the use of grand jury subpoenas. Left unchecked,
the government may potentially abuse its subpoena power by creating
a “safety net” to sanitize otherwise unlawful searches.
B. The Role of Grand Jury Subpoenas
43

Rooted in Anglo-American history, the requirement of a grand
jury in the federal criminal system is firmly established in the Fifth
44
Amendment. The grand jury serves both an investigatory function
45
and as a protection against unfounded government prosecution.
46
Thus, the grand jury acts as a “fourth branch” of government, with a
47
“special role in insuring fair and effective law enforcement.” To accomplish this important task, grand juries are afforded broad investi48
gatory powers including the ability to compel testimony. As a result,
“[t]he federal grand jury is the most powerful weapon in the prosecu49
tor’s arsenal.” Federal prosecutors are given broad discretion to decide when to investigate and prosecute crimes, often employing
50
grand juries to facilitate their investigations.

43

44
45
46

47
48

49
50

See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 342 (1974) (“The institution of the grand jury
is deeply rooted in Anglo-American history.”); see also Costello v. United States, 350 U.S.
359, 362 (1956) (discussing the history of the grand jury as an English institution).
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury . . . .”).
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
See John F. Decker, Legislating Federalism: The Call for Grand Jury Reform in the States, 58
OKLA. L. REV. 341, 350 (2005) (“The grand jury . . . is an independent body of citizens,
sometimes described as a fourth branch of the government.”); see also United States v.
Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992) (explaining that the grand jury “serv[es] as a kind of
buffer or referee between the Government and the people”); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 571 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he grand jury continues to function as a barrier to reckless or unfounded charges.”).
Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343.
See id. at 345 (“The power of a federal court to compel persons to appear and testify before a grand jury is . . . firmly established.”); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453
(1972) (holding that testimony can be compelled under the Fifth Amendment).
Anthony A. Joseph & William D. Jones III, A Grand Jury Primer for Corporate Representation,
63 ALA. LAW. 227, 227 (2002).
See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (describing the discretion of
federal prosecutors to bring charges before a grand jury). However, the discretion of the
prosecutor is not without limitations. See James F. Holderman & Charles B. Redfern, Preindictment Prosecutorial Conduct in the Federal System Revisited, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
527, 537–38 (2006) (“[A] federal prosecutor cannot use the grand jury for the sole or
dominant purpose of: (1) obtaining additional evidence on charges already made against
an indicted defendant, or (2) eliciting evidence for a civil case. A prosecutor also cannot
use the grand jury . . . in the search for a fugitive in whose testimony the grand jury has
no interest.” (footnotes omitted)).

Feb. 2009]

POTENTIAL ABUSE OF THE SUBPOENA

763

By initiating a grand jury investigation, federal prosecutors open
the door to a powerful and judicially sanctioned investigatory tool:
the subpoena. The grand jury may serve a subpoena to compel tes51
timony or the production of documents. Although the subpoena is
authorized by the court, the content of a grand jury subpoena at the
time of issuance is at the discretion of the prosecutor. Unlike warrants, subpoenas are traditionally served without prior judicial ap52
proval. Moreover, the issuance of a grand jury subpoena does not
53
necessarily require prior grand jury approval. As a result, the “almost limitless subpoena power” is “something akin to a blank check”
54
for federal prosecutors. Some limitations on the grand jury’s subpoena power do exist. For example, subpoenas may not be issued to
prepare for trial, gather evidence for a civil case, intimidate a witness,
55
or conduct an interview. Except for these limitations, the initial decision to issue a subpoena and the subpoena’s content are at the sole
discretion of the prosecutor.
56
Grand jury subpoenas enjoy a presumption of legitimacy. Defendants may move to quash or modify a subpoena only “if compli57
ance would be unreasonable or oppressive.” For example, subpoenas may be quashed if they are overly broad, unreasonable in time
58
frame, or not described with particularity. However, the success rate
59
of quashing a subpoena is predictably low. A party seeking to quash
51

52

53

54
55
56

57
58

59

See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 372 (1911) (declaring that a subpoena duces
tecum has the “power to compel the production of documents . . . . [and] may be enforced independently of [a witness’s] testimony”).
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(a) (“The clerk must issue a blank subpoena—signed and sealed—
to the party requesting it, and that party must fill in the blanks before the subpoena is
served.”).
See, e.g., Lopez v. Dep’t of Justice, 393 F.3d 1345, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“The prosecutor
may issue the subpoena without the knowledge of the grand jury, but his authority to do
so is grounded in the grand jury investigation, not the prosecutor’s own inquiry.”).
See Stuntz, supra note 2, at 861, 864.
For further discussion on a grand jury’s limitations, see Holderman & Redfern, supra note
50, at 540, and Joseph & Jones, supra note 49, at 227.
See United States v. R. Enters., 498 U.S. 292, 300 (1991) (“[T]he law presumes, absent a
strong showing to the contrary, that a grand jury acts within the legitimate scope of its authority.”).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(2).
See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 429 F.3d 140, 149 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[A] party seeking
such a subpoena must establish: (1) the subpoenaed document is relevant, (2) it is admissible, and (3) that it has been requested with adequate specificity.”).
See Constitutional Rights and the Grand Jury: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 80 (2000) (statement of Andrew D. Leipold,
Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law) (“[T]he standards for quashing a
subpoena are government-friendly. . . . [T]he success rate of these motions is predictably
low.”).
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60

a subpoena based on reasonableness must overcome a high hurdle,
and it is equally difficult to quash a subpoena based on constitutional
61
62
challenges. Thus, aside from motions on the grounds of privilege,
motions to quash are rarely successful. When balancing the grand
jury’s need for a full investigation against the rights of individuals,
courts generally prefer to give the grand jury—and thus the federal
prosecutor—sweeping investigatory authority with little judicial oversight.
C. Applying the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine to Grand Jury Subpoenas
Historically, subpoenas have been the subject of exceptions to the
exclusionary rule. In 1920, the exclusionary rule and grand jury sub63
poenas clashed in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States. In Silverthorne, federal agents illegally searched the business of the defendants
and seized certain documents. The district court ordered that the
unlawfully seized items be returned. The government, armed with
the knowledge from the illegal search, then served a subpoena on the
defendants to produce the same documents which had been illegally
seized and returned. The Supreme Court condemned the government’s two-step plan to circumvent the Fourth Amendment, holding
64
that it “reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words.” Reaf65
firming the exclusionary rule set out in Weeks v. United States, the
Court proclaimed that evidence which was unlawfully seized “shall
66
not be used at all” and cannot be the basis for a subpoena. Although this case laid the groundwork for the independent source
60

61

62

63
64
65
66

See R. Enters., 498 U.S. at 301 (holding that when “a subpoena is challenged on relevancy
grounds, the motion to quash must be denied unless the district court determines that
there is no reasonable possibility that the category of materials the Government seeks will
produce information relevant to the general subject of the grand jury’s investigation”).
Subpoenas may also be challenged on First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment grounds.
However, the likelihood of success on these motions to quash is also low. See United
States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 27 (2000) (holding that the Fifth Amendment’s protection
against self-incrimination may apply when producing documents in compliance with a
subpoena); Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408 (1984) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment requires a subpoena to be reasonable); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
667 (1972) (holding that the First Amendment does not absolutely protect reporters
from testifying before a grand jury).
Subpoenas may be quashed or modified when the documents requested are privileged.
See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 2 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 3D
§ 275 (2007).
251 U.S. 385 (1920).
Id. at 392.
232 U.S. 383 (1914).
Id.
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67

doctrine, the Court held that in this instance “the knowledge gained
by the Government’s own wrong cannot be used by it in the way pro68
posed.” As Silverthorne illustrates, the potential for abuse of the subpoena power is not a new phenomenon. Rather, the struggle between subpoenas and the exclusionary rule began almost
immediately after the Court first adopted the exclusionary rule in
69
1914.
Circuit courts have directly addressed the conflict between the inevitable discovery doctrine and grand jury subpoenas. In United States
v. Eng, the Second Circuit concluded that the issuance of a subpoena
70
may be sufficient to satisfy the inevitable discovery exception. In
Eng, the defendant was under investigation by the Drug Enforcement
Administration and the Internal Revenue Service for narcotics and
71
money laundering. As part of its investigation, the government subpoenaed various bank records. After two months, the government
arrested Eng and seized materials from his private safe without a warrant. Subsequently, the government subpoenaed various other bank
records.
Eng moved to suppress the evidence from the safe and any derivative evidence from the subpoenas. The district court denied the motion, applying the inevitable discovery doctrine due to the pre-search
72
subpoenas. After remanding the case for “particularized findings,”
the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s findings and its appli73
cation of the inevitable discovery doctrine.
Importantly, the Second Circuit affirmed that subpoenas are sufficient to trigger inevitable discovery. As Anthony Girese explains, “the
main thrust of [Eng] . . . [is that] the inevitable discovery doctrine
may be applied to evidence obtained pursuant to pre- or postillegality subpoenas, or even to evidence that would have been sub74
poenaed.”
In order to reach this conclusion, the court distin-

67

68
69
70
71
72
73
74

See id. (“Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and
inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may be
proved like any others . . . .”).
Id.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
971 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1992).
Id. at 856.
See id. at 864 (stating that “the challenged evidence inevitably would have been discovered”).
United States v. Eng, 997 F.2d 987, 988 (2d Cir. 1993).
Anthony J. Girese, They Would Have Found It Anyway: United States v. Eng and the “Inevitable Subpoena,” 59 BROOK. L. REV. 461, 492 (1993) (emphasis omitted).

766

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 11:3

75

guished a prior case, United States v. Roberts, which found that an outstanding subpoena was insufficient to conclude that discovery was inevitable. By distinguishing Roberts, the court rejected the defendant’s
argument that “the subpoena power never may be relied upon by the
76
government to meet the inevitable discovery burden of proof.”
Rather, the Second Circuit opened the door for using the subpoena
power as a basis for inevitable discovery:
The circumstances revealed in Roberts, which made it unlikely that the
subpoena would produce any evidence, must be contrasted with a situation where the government can demonstrate a substantial and convincing basis for believing that the requisite information would have been obtained by subpoena. Where the government is able to make such a
demonstration, there is no reason why the government may not rely
upon the subpoena power as one way it might meet the burden of prov77
ing inevitable discovery by a preponderance of the evidence.

However, the Second Circuit expressed concerns about applying
the inevitable discovery exception to subpoenas, urging that “special
care is required on the part of a district court when the government
78
relies on the subpoena power.” The court required that the government show “that both issuance of the subpoena, and a response to
79
the subpoena producing the evidence in question, were inevitable.”
The Second Circuit was primarily concerned with the difference between subpoenas and search warrants, reiterating its concerns in Roberts that “the recipient of a subpoena may falsely claim to have lost or
destroyed the documents called for, or may even deliberately conceal
80
or destroy them after service of the subpoena.” In closing, the court
warned that “subpoenas must not serve as an after the fact ‘insurance
policy’ to ‘validate’ an unlawful search under the inevitable discovery
81
doctrine.”
The Ninth Circuit has expressed similar concerns about the dangers of the subpoena power. In Center Art Galleries—Hawaii, Inc. v.
82
United States, the government served subpoenas after executing numerous warranted seizures. The district court held the warrants to be
overbroad and ordered the return of the seized property. The gov-

75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

852 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1988) (listing instances in which a subpoena would not lead to the
return of documents).
Eng, 971 F.2d at 860 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Roberts, 852 F.2d at 676.
Eng, 971 F.2d at 861 (emphasis added).
875 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1989).
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ernment appealed the order, arguing that the evidence would have
been inevitably discovered via the subpoenas. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that “the [inevitable discovery] doctrine will not be applied to validate an illegal seizure when inevitable
discovery is predicated upon a subpoena served to compel produc83
tion of the seized items.” The district court emphasized the potential dangers of applying the government’s subpoena power to inevitable discovery:
[T]he subpoenas were served after the search and seizure. At the time
the subpoenas were served there was nothing left to discover. This leads
to the inevitable conclusion that the subpoenas were used as an “insurance policy” in the event of a subsequent invalidation of the search and
seizure. This should not be permitted. Such a rule would allow the government to violate the Fourth Amendment with impunity as long as they
84
could obtain a subpoena.

Relying heavily on the Second Circuit’s decision in Roberts, the Ninth
Circuit also condemned the use of the subpoena as an after-the-fact
85
“insurance policy.” The court reasoned that:
The mere fact that the government serves a subpoena, however, does not
mean that it will obtain the documents it requests. A subpoena can be
invalid for a variety of reasons, as when it is unduly burdensome, when it
violates the right against self-incrimination, or when it calls for privileged
86
documents . . . .

It is important to note that this case was decided before the Second
Circuit’s rulings in Eng. More recently, the Ninth Circuit has approved the application of the inevitable discovery doctrine to sub87
poenas in some circumstances.
Given that the long-term impact of Hudson on the inevitable dis88
covery doctrine remains unclear, Hudson’s impact on the application of the inevitable discovery exception to grand jury subpoenas is
also unknown. Assuming arguendo that lower courts interpret Hudson as providing a broad interpretation of the inevitable discovery
89
doctrine, it follows that courts will be able to more easily apply the
83
84
85
86
87

88
89

Id. at 755.
In re Motion for Return of Property Pursuant to Rule 41, Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 681 F. Supp. 677, 687 (D. Haw. 1988).
Ctr. Art Galleries, 875 F.2d at 755.
Id. at 754 (citing United States v. Roberts, 852 F.2d 671, 675 (2d Cir. 1988)).
See United States v. Hazelwood, 40 F. App’x 347, 350 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming the application of inevitable discovery to bank records that “could readily have been obtained via
subpoenas on the banks”).
See supra Part I.A.
See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing the “parallel universe” exception in
Hudson).
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doctrine in the future. Under this expanded doctrine, lower courts
may be more willing to justify inevitable discovery based on a potential grand jury subpoena. Regardless, subpoenas have already been
recognized by various circuit courts as a basis for inevitable discovery.
Even if courts do not interpret Hudson as expanding the scope of inevitable discovery, it seems likely that courts will continue to rely on
grand jury subpoenas to support a finding of inevitable discovery.
II. CASE STUDY OF THE POTENTIAL DANGERS OF AN “INEVITABLE”
SUBPOENA: UNITED STATES V. VILAR
Already a powerful investigatory tool, the subpoena becomes even
more potent when combined with the inevitable discovery exception
to the exclusionary rule. If left unchecked, the subpoena power may
be used as an “insurance policy” to validate otherwise unlawful
90
searches. Given that subpoenas are issued with little judicial oversight and with few limitations, there is considerable potential for governmental abuse. This potential government abuse can take many
forms. For example, knowing that the prosecutor can always “fall
back” on a subpoena to declare evidence inevitably discoverable, officers may intentionally perform unlawful searches to gain evidence.
Another apt example of abuse, as illustrated by the case discussed below, is that prosecutors will issue subpoenas concurrently with search
warrants as “backup” plans. The potential for abuse would be magnified if lower courts interpret the inevitable discovery exception
broadly under Hudson, often allowing subpoenas to provide a basis
for “inevitability.”
A recent case illustrating the potential danger of the inevitable
91
discovery exception is United States v. Vilar. In Vilar, the government
executed a search warrant upon the offices of Amerindo on suspicion
of securities fraud and other charges. The Government seized
around 170 boxes of documents and 30 computers during the search,
92
which took around twelve hours. While the search was being executed—and after sensitive information had already been seized—the
defendant’s attorney negotiated with the Assistant United States At-

90
91

92

See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
530 F. Supp. 2d 616, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that evidence recovered during a
search conducted while defendant negotiated with the Government is admissible under
inevitable discovery rule); see also United States v. Vilar, No. S305CR621KMK, 2007 WL
1075041 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007).
Vilar, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 620.
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torney (“AUSA”) to accept a grand jury subpoena if the government
93
ceased its search.
In subsequent proceedings, the district court partly suppressed
findings from the search for violating probable cause, particularity,
94
and reasonableness. As a result, evidence discovered under the invalid portions of the warrant was excluded. However, “given the
more relaxed relevancy requirements applied in evaluating a subpoena,” there was a “broader set of documents that could be lawfully
pursued by means of the Subpoena rather than by means of the War95
rant.” This “created a category of documents that . . . were illegally
seized from Amerindo’s office pursuant to . . . the Warrant, [but] fell
96
within the scope . . . of the Subpoena.”
The government argued that the challenged documents should
be admissible based on the inevitable discovery and independent
source exceptions to the exclusionary rule. Put simply, the government contended that the documents would have inevitably been discovered via the subpoena, regardless of the invalid portions of the
search warrant. The district court agreed, holding that the docu97
ments were admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. The
court declined to accept the defendant’s argument that the unlawful
search itself—and thus the subsequent discussion between the defense attorney and the AUSA—triggered the subpoena.
98
Relying on the Second Circuit’s opinion in Eng, the district court
applied the inevitable discovery exception to the subpoena. The district court looked to four factors. First, the court found that the subpoena “was not issued on the basis of information unlawfully gained
99
from Amerindo.” In other words, there was “no concern that, in determining the contents of the Subpoena, the Government relied
100
upon information obtained during the course of the initial search.”
Second, the government “established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Subpoena was the product of an ‘active and ongoing
101
investigation’ into suspected wrongdoing by Defendants.”
Third,
the court found that “absent the invalid portions of the War-

93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. These documents are referred to as the “Challenged Documents.”
Id. at 632.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
Vilar, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 627.
Id.
Id.
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rant, . . . the Government would have inevitably issued the Subpoena”
102
after speaking with the defense attorney. Specifically, the court reasoned that the invalid portions of the warrant did not prompt the de103
fense attorney’s discussion with the AUSA. Fourth, the government
established that “(1) [d]efendants would have inevitably produced
the Challenged Documents in response to the Subpoena, and
(2) none of the concerns listed in Roberts [such as lost, concealed, or
destroyed documents] would have presented an obstacle to the dis104
covery of the Challenged Documents.” As support for this last finding, the court relied on instances when “[d]efendants repeatedly and
unambiguously stated their intention to cooperate with the Govern105
ment’s lawful requests for documents.”
Vilar illustrates an ideal scenario with the potential for government abuse. The defendants in Vilar recognized such dangers, arguing that the subpoena was an “insurance policy” to validate the overbroad warrant.
The trial court disagreed, finding that “the
Government issued the Subpoena not to cure any defects in the Warrant, but to provide an added incentive to Amerindo to provide the
106
sought-after materials.”
Consequently, the court “rejected Defendants’ assertion that the Government ‘viewed the Subpoena as some
107
sort of an insurance policy against a shaky warrant.’” Nevertheless,
Vilar is an excellent example of a situation in which the government
may abuse its subpoena power as a contingency plan for questionable
warrants. Even if the government does not intentionally act to circumvent the Fourth Amendment, Vilar demonstrates the power of
the inevitable discovery exception, if interpreted too broadly, to bypass protections against unreasonable searches or seizures.
III. INEVITABILITY OF ISSUANCE AND INEVITABILITY OF COMPLIANCE:
THREE CHRONOLOGICAL SCENARIOS OF ILLEGAL SEARCHES AND
SUBPOENAS
In the context of an unlawful search, the determination of
whether a subpoena is sufficient to trigger the inevitable discovery
exception can be separated into two elements: inevitability of issu-

102
103
104
105
106
107

Id. at 628.
Id. at 629.
Id. at 631.
Id.
Id. at 630 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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108

ance and inevitability of production.
Both elements are necessary
to prove inevitable discovery. “Inevitability of issuance” can be defined as whether a subpoena would have been inevitably issued butfor the unlawful search. This first inquiry asks what the government
would have done absent the unlawful conduct. “Inevitability of production” (or compliance) is whether the evidence would have been
inevitably produced by the subpoenaed party. This second inquiry
involves predicting the defendant’s response absent the unlawful event.
Using Vilar as an example, elements one through three in the Vilar
test determine inevitability of issuance by questioning what information the government relied upon and predicting how the government
would have acted. On the other hand, element four in the Vilar test
asks, almost verbatim, whether documents would have been inevitably
109
produced by the defendant.
In order to determine that evidence would have been inevitably
discovered, both the requirements of inevitable “issuance” and “production” must be satisfied. As the Second Circuit recognized in Eng,
“the government must show that both issuance of the subpoena, and
a response to the subpoena producing the evidence in question, were
110
inevitable.” Anthony Girese considers this dual requirement to be
111
the “key safeguard for the exclusionary rule.” Notably, the difficulty
in satisfying these two elements depends upon the facts in each case.
Some factors the court may consider include the nature of the sub112
poena’s target and the scope of the investigation. Another important question to consider is at what point in the investigation the subpoena was issued, if one was issued at all. To answer this vital
question, the court must carefully evaluate the chronological sequence of events.
Assuming the existence of an unlawful search, three chronological
scenarios emerge in which a court could rely on a grand jury subpoena to invoke the inevitable discovery exception. In the first instance, a subpoena is issued prior to the unlawful search. This situation most closely resembles the traditional independent source
rationale and is most likely to trigger inevitable discovery. In the second instance, a subpoena is issued concurrently with the illegal
108
109

110
111
112

See Girese, supra note 74, at 498.
See Vilar, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 627 (explaining that the government is required to establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged documents would have been inevitably discovered without relying upon the unlawfully gained information).
United States v. Eng, 971 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1992).
Girese, supra note 74, at 496–98.
See id. at 499–500.
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search or soon thereafter. When the subpoena is issued after the
search, it becomes more difficult to demonstrate inevitability, because
the subpoena may be based on evidence which was unlawfully obtained. Moreover, this scenario often calls the motivations of the
government into question, and the court may very well suspect that
the subpoena is being utilized as a “backup plan” to the seemingly
unlawful search. In the third instance, an unlawful search occurred,
but no subpoena is issued. This is the most difficult scenario for the
government to demonstrate inevitable discovery. In all three of these
scenarios, courts must be aware of the subpoena’s potential for abuse
when applying the inevitable discovery exception.
A. Scenario 1: Issuance of a Subpoena Prior to the Unlawful Search
Of the three scenarios presented, the issuance of a subpoena prior
to the unlawful search is the most likely to implicate the inevitable
discovery exception. In this situation, the subpoena is issued prior to
the unlawful search, so there is no fear that the issuance of the subpoena was tainted by the unlawful act. Thus, it can easily be demonstrated that the subpoena was inevitably issued. The most significant
problem with demonstrating inevitability in this instance is proving
inevitable production. In other words, the court cannot simply assume that the target of a subpoena will produce all of the documents
requested in the subpoena. As the Second Circuit recognized in Roberts, the target of a subpoena can destroy or conceal the requested re113
cords. As a result, the court will need to examine the facts in each
case to determine whether the party would have produced the requested documents. For example, in Vilar, the court looked to
statements by the defendant and his attorney which promised com114
pliance with the subpoena.
Putting aside the difficulty of demonstrating the inevitability of
production, subpoenas issued prior to the unlawful search most
closely fit the traditional application of inevitable discovery. The existence of a prior independent source—the prior subpoena—
resembles the facts in Nix, where a search party began looking for the
115
victim’s body prior to the unlawful confession.
Given that the
113
114
115

See United States v. Roberts, 852 F.2d 671, 676 (2d Cir. 1988).
See Vilar, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 631.
See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 449–50 (1984) (“On this record it is clear that the
search parties were approaching the actual location of the body, and . . . that the volunteer search teams would have resumed the search had Williams not earlier led the police
to the body and the body inevitably would have been found.”).
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Court’s acceptance of the inevitable discovery exception in Nix was
116
supported as an extension of the independent source doctrine, the
presence of a prior subpoena would present a strong case for its application. Thus, courts would be most likely to invoke the inevitable
discovery doctrine in this first scenario, when a subpoena is issued
prior to the unlawful police conduct.
In addition, this first scenario search appears to have the least potential for abuse. In this case, the government’s use of the subpoena
power seems to conform to its intended purpose as an investigatory
tool. For example, with the knowledge gained from a suspect’s responses to a subpoena, the government may establish the necessary
probable cause to serve a valid search warrant on the suspect. Without the knowledge that its future search would be declared invalid,
the government’s motive regarding the initial subpoena appears to
be genuine.
However, it is still possible that a prosecutor may think strategically and issue the prior subpoena as an “insurance policy.” Consequently, while this first scenario appears on its face to have minimal
potential for abuse, the actual potential for governmental misconduct
is enormous. In response, courts should be as wary of applying inevitable discovery to a prior subpoena as they may be in other situations.
Specifically, courts must scrutinize the facts to determine whether
production of the subpoenaed documents was inevitable. When in
doubt, courts should err on the side of caution and assume that questionable documents may have been lost or that a party may have refused to produce them.
B. Scenario 2: Issuance of a Subpoena Concurrently With or After the
Unlawful Search
When the subpoena is issued after the unlawful search, courts will
be less likely to invoke the inevitable discovery exception. In addition
to the usual problems associated with the inevitability of production,
this scenario also begins to question the inevitability of issuance, because a subpoena may have been issued based on information which
was unlawfully obtained. As the Second Circuit recognized, “the
Government must establish that the investigation was not ‘trigger[ed]’ . . . by the information unlawfully gained by the illegal

116

See id. at 443–44 (noting the functional similarity between the independent source doctrine and the inevitable discovery exception).
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117

search.” For example, the first factor in the Vilar test was that “the
Subpoena was issued independently of any information obtained by
118
means of the unlawful portions of the Warrant.”
Thus, at least
some courts have recognized the uncertainty regarding the inevitability of issuance in this scenario. As a result, a subpoena issued after an
unlawful search receives more scrutiny from the court and is less likely to invoke the inevitable discovery exception.
Moreover, the potential for governmental abuse greatly increases
when subpoenas are issued concurrently with, or after, an unlawful
search. This second scenario often calls the government’s motives
into question. In these cases, the issuance of subpoenas begins to
look like the dreaded “insurance policy” criticized by the Second and
119
Ninth Circuits.
Within this scenario, two problematic series of
events may occur.
In the first series of events, the government issues a subpoena after the unlawful search but before a court rules upon the admissibility
of the evidence. In this instance, the government would not yet know
whether its search will be upheld upon a motion to suppress. The
“worst case” scenario is as follows: worried that the fruits of its search
may eventually be suppressed, the government issues subpoenas for
the same evidence discovered in the search. Although this disingenuous motive will not be true in all cases, this sequence of events
should signal caution when courts evaluate arguments of inevitable
discovery. As the Second Circuit recognized in Eng, “[p]articular
care is appropriate where . . . subpoenas are issued after or at the
120
time of the unlawful search . . . .”
While the most questionable
subpoenas in Eng were issued after the unlawful search, troublesome
121
subpoenas may also be issued concurrently with an unlawful search.
In the second series of events, the government issues a subpoena
after a search has already been declared unlawful or invalid by the
court. In this instance, the government’s motives are more transparent, and case law demonstrates that this obvious attempt to circumvent the Fourth Amendment would not likely be upheld. As the Supreme Court made clear in Silverthorne, the government cannot
perform an illegal search, have the documents suppressed, and then
117
118
119
120
121

Vilar, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 625 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Eng, 971
F.2d 854, 871 (2d Cir. 1992)).
Id. at 634.
Eng, 971 F.2d at 861 (quoting Ctr. Art Galleries v. United States, 875 F.2d 747, 755 (9th
Cir. 1989)).
Id. at 860.
See supra Part II (discussing Vilar, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 616).
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122

subpoena the identical documents.
The Court held that such an
action “reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words” because
“[t]he essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence
in a certain way is . . . not merely . . . [that the evidence] shall not be
123
used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.” Consistent
with Silverthorne, courts are unlikely to accept an argument of inevitable discovery when the requested documents have already been suppressed prior to the issuance of a subpoena.
C. Scenario 3: Unlawful Search Without the Issuance of a Subpoena
In the third scenario, the government attempts to rely on the inevitable discovery exception after a search has been declared unlawful, even though no subpoena has been issued. This is the least likely
scenario for invoking the inevitable discovery exception, because the
government must overcome significant hurdles to demonstrate both
inevitability of issuance and inevitability of production. Here, the
question of issuance becomes central, since prosecutors are arguing
that although no subpoena was issued, the government would have
hypothetically (and inevitably) issued a subpoena absent the unlawful
search. In the prior scenarios, the government must simply demonstrate that it would have acted similarly (by issuing a subpoena) absent
the unlawful event. However, in this final scenario the government
must prove that it would have acted differently (and actually issued a
subpoena) but-for the unlawful search.
The Second Circuit opened the possibility of this third scenario in
Eng. On remand, the district court noted that “the presence or absence of a post-search subpoena is irrelevant to the question of
whether the government inevitably would have discovered the evi124
dence absent the primary illegality.” The court recognized that “actual issuance [of a subpoena] is not a prerequisite for the application
of the inevitable discovery doctrine. Sufficient proof that such sub125
poenas would have issued will demonstrate inevitability.”
Upon
opening the door to an inevitable subpoena, the Second Circuit also
recognized that “special care is required on the part of a district court
126
when the government relies on the subpoena power.” In addition
122
123
124
125
126

See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391–92 (1920) (holding that
evidence gathered from the subpoena must be excluded).
Id. at 392 (emphasis added).
United States v. Eng, 819 F. Supp. 1198, 1224 (E.D.N.Y 1993).
Girese, supra note 74, at 502.
United States v. Eng, 971 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1992).
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to requiring proof of both issuance and production, the Court insisted on “a substantial degree of directness in the government’s
chain of discovery argument, rather than a hypothesized ‘leapfrog127
ging’ . . . until the piece of evidence is reached.” This Second Circuit test applies to all three chronological scenarios, but the test
makes it most difficult to prove inevitable discovery in cases where no
subpoena had been issued.
Although proving “inevitable issuance” in this scenario is a daunting task, it is not impossible. In fact, proving the inevitable issuance
of a subpoena may be easier than proving the inevitable issuance of a
128
warrant.
To prove the “inevitable” issuance of a warrant, the government would need to demonstrate that a neutral magistrate would
have approved the warrant application upon a showing of sufficient
129
probable cause. Yet, since subpoenas are issued at the discretion of
130
prosecutors with little judicial oversight, such a showing is unnecessary to demonstrate the inevitability of issuance concerning subpoenas. Nevertheless, demonstrating both issuance and production
when no subpoena had been issued is a difficult task. Consequently,
courts are least likely to apply inevitable discovery in this third scenario.
In addition, this scenario presents the most troubling situation for
131
Without the need to have a preabuse of the subpoena power.
existing or even a post-search subpoena, this argument can be made
in many more cases. If courts accept this argument with regularity,
prosecutors will be able to introduce tainted evidence with relative
ease, essentially bypassing the warrant requirement of the Fourth
132
Amendment. Moreover, contrary to the purposes of the exclusion133
ary rule, this may incentivize police officers to perform unlawful
searches and seizures, knowing that such violations can easily be

127
128
129
130
131
132

133

Id.
See Girese, supra note 74, at 493 (distinguishing the “inevitable subpoena” from the “inevitable warrant”).
See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 540 (1988).
See supra Part I.B.
See id. (expressing uneasiness about the Second Circuit’s acceptance of the “inevitable
subpoena” argument in Eng).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people . . . against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause . . . .”).
See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (6th Cir. 1974) (clarifying that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police behavior).
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cured. Thus, frequent acceptance of this third scenario has the po134
tential to warp the exclusionary rule itself.
IV. CLOSE JUDICIAL SCRUTINY AND CASE-BY-CASE ANALYSIS IS
REQUIRED TO AVOID GOVERNMENTAL ABUSE OF THE SUBPOENA POWER
The Second Circuit test in Eng is an excellent example of how
courts should scrutinize grand jury subpoenas in the context of inevitable discovery. Most importantly, courts should follow Eng’s dual inevitability requirement by demanding that the government prove
both “inevitability of issuance” and “inevitability of production.”
Moreover, determining whether the government meets each requirement involves a careful case-by-case analysis. Among the many
factors that the court should consider, the chronological sequence of
events—specifically when the subpoena was issued—should be a key
element in the analysis. As evidenced by the three chronological scenarios, the likelihood of courts applying the inevitable discovery exception should be reduced as the issuance of the subpoena moves
further after the unlawful event. At the same time, the potential for
abuse of the subpoena power becomes greater as issuance moves further from the unlawful search. This sliding scale, if applied properly,
would strike a delicate balance between allowing exceptions to the
exclusionary rule, while still preserving the rule’s purpose of deterring unlawful police behavior.
At first glance, the Second Circuit test appears to have adequately
protected individuals from potential governmental abuse of the subpoena power. However, it is important to recognize that courts must
always be wary when invoking the inevitable discovery rule based on
subpoenas. Notably, judicial vigilance is equally necessary in the first
chronological scenario, even though the government’s motives may
appear to be genuine. As subpoenas become a more widely used tool
by prosecutors in white collar investigations, even this first scenario
has the potential for abuse. If police officers learn that a prior subpoena signals a “green light” for unlawful searches, this may encourage the exact police behavior that the exclusionary rule is meant to
deter.

134

Regular acceptance of any of the exclusionary rule exceptions may also warp the exclusionary rule. However, this third scenario could be used most frequently, since it does
not require the issuance of a subpoena at all. Therefore, the dangers of this scenario are
more pronounced than in other circumstances.
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In order to prevent this scenario, courts must carefully examine
the motives of the government when invoking the inevitable discovery argument based on a prior subpoena. This examination is necessary for all three chronological scenarios, but may often be overlooked in the context of prior subpoenas. Although prior subpoenas
generally serve important investigatory functions, these subpoenas
may still act as an “insurance policy” against unlawful searches if left
unchecked.
When a subpoena has been issued, courts should carefully evaluate subpoenas to determine the subpoena’s boundaries and scope.
Unlike warrants, which usually require the court to review the scope
of the warrant prior to its issuance, courts have little influence on the
scope of subpoenas when they are initially issued. As a result, courts
should carefully consider the scope of subpoenas—exactly what documents the subpoenas requested and how specifically they requested
those documents—to determine the inevitability of production. Only
when the subpoena is sufficiently detailed should a court determine
that compliance with the subpoena would have been inevitable.
Moreover, courts should examine the egregiousness of the unlawful
search. By examining the context surrounding the unlawful search,
the court can also infer the government’s motives in issuing the subpoena. Courts should favor subpoenas which are used as investigatory tools over subpoenas designed to bypass Fourth Amendment
protections regarding searches.
Regardless of when a subpoena is issued (if one has been issued at
all), courts must always bear in mind that the target of subpoenas will
not always fully comply with the government’s requests. Although
courts may want to believe that all law-abiding citizens will produce
the requested documents, this assumption would not properly reflect
135
the dynamics of a grand jury investigation. Rather, unless the government can point to specific facts demonstrating a likelihood of
compliance, courts should err on the side of caution concerning the
inevitability of production. For example, in Vilar the court relied
upon statements made by the defendant and his attorney promising
136
that the defendant would produce the requested documents.
Al135

See supra note 80 and accompanying text (describing concerns in United States v. Roberts,
852 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1988)).

136

United States v. Vilar, 530 F. Supp. 2d 161, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[T]he Government has
pointed to multiple instances—both before, during, and after the Government’s search
of Amerindo’s office—wherein . . . Defendants repeatedly and unambiguously stated
their intention to cooperate with the Government’s lawful requests for documents in this
case.”).
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though one could easily question whether such statements are sufficient proof of “inevitable compliance,” such an inquiry is vital to
demonstrate inevitable discovery. If courts fail to question whether
issuance and production are both inevitable, then courts will fail to
protect individuals from the potential abuse of the subpoena power.
With proper judicial oversight, subpoenas can act as the source of
inevitable discovery without distorting the purpose of the exclusionary rule. At its core, the exclusionary rule is designed to discourage
unlawful police behavior. Only when the exceptions to the rule begin to encourage unlawful police behavior—such as searching without a proper warrant—do the exceptions run the risk of swallowing
137
the rule altogether. Due to the relative ease of obtaining subpoenas
and their prevalence as an investigatory tool, such fears are more
pronounced in the context of subpoenas. These fears are magnified
by the Supreme Court’s arguably broad interpretation of inevitable
discovery in Hudson. However, such fears need not be realized. Careful judicial scrutiny should be applied in all three chronological scenarios, limiting the frequency with which inevitable discovery is invoked based on grand jury subpoenas.
CONCLUSION
Although the subpoena power has the potential for government
abuse when used in connection with the inevitable discovery doctrine, careful attention by courts to both “inevitable issuance” and
“inevitable production” can thwart such abuse. Three chronological
scenarios exist when invoking the inevitable discovery exception
based upon grand jury subpoenas: (1) prior issued subpoenas;
(2) subsequently or concurrently issued subpoenas; and (3) nonissued subpoenas. While the last two scenarios have the most potential for abuse, the first scenario is equally dangerous and also requires
heightened judicial scrutiny. Courts must carefully evaluate both the
scope of the subpoena and the motives behind the government’s issuance of the subpoena. By limiting the application of inevitable discovery in the context of subpoenas, courts can maintain the integrity
of the exclusionary rule.
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United States v. Eng, 971 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1992) (recognizing “the need to prevent
the inevitable discovery exception from swallowing the exclusionary rule”).

